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An important question for enactive inter-
faces is the question of their social accept-
ance and of their social dimension. 
To approach this question, we first pro-
pose to distinguish the modes in which tech-
nical artefacts exist. First of all, we can 
distinguish two modes: in-hand and put-
down [Heidegger, 1996]. Put-down corres-
ponds to the mode in which the artefact is 
the object of the explicit attention as an 
assembly of the matter with certain propri-
eties (the specifically scientific mode of rela-
tion to the object). One can think on the 
difference between designing and riding the 
bicycle. The in-hand mode is the mode in 
which the user is engaged in the activity, and 
in which, under normal conditions, the arte-
fact is transparent, one feels it like the exten-
sion of the body, not like the object of the 
physics !! "#$%&'$()*(+,#-($,./*012#.*1-3 [Merleau-
Ponty, 1945]. 
The fact that technical artefacts exist in the 
mode of being put down has an important 
consequence: the persons who design and 
make technical artefacts are, generally, not 
the same as those who use them. Thus, tech-
nological development goes together with a 
division of labour and, correlatively, the 
development of mechanisms of social syn-
thesis (exchange, market economies), which 
organize the integration of technical systems 
as functional wholes. 
Traditionally, social and political science 
(with the exception of Marx) has not paid 
much attention to technology, which is usu-
ally considered as a black box, as intrinsically 
neutral means to pre-defined ends. The 
approach outlined here leads to a new per-
spective in which technology occupies a 
central position. The work of engineers has 
immense social significance because, in fine, 
the choices of technological devices and 
systems fashion the human condition itself, 
by constructing the world that human beings 
live in, and particularly by manufacturing 
interfaces that change the means of action, 
and influence sensations. Thus, in our soci-
ety, any really serious political debate neces-
sarily involves debate on technological 
choices. 
Since the technology is not something neu-
tral, it affects the quality of interaction be-
tween the human and the world. This 
introduces the debate about the usage of 
technology. Is the knowledge of the usage 
situated in the user? Does the quality of the 
interaction depend only on this user’s know-
ledge? How to make an artefact responding 
to the enactive knowledge of the user? 
On our point of view, we need to under-
stand how the enaction takes place between 
the two terms, the user and the artefact. In 
other words, in the case of human being, it 
seems impossible to talk about a standalone 
user on whose knowledge depends the use of 
the artefact, and the ability to make it enac-
tive. Since the enactive knowledge (if one 
considers enactive as the sensori-motor 
knowledge) is not something independent on 
the practice of artefacts, it seems difficult to 
say that it is situated in the user. If we agree 
that the artefact modifies the established 
sensory-motor contingencies, then the enac-
tive knowledge depends on the artefacts. 
Now, the enactive is a quality that does re-
late to the individual, and that it is the human 
who enacts: the experience of enaction (i.e. 
experience of an enacted world as a world of 
possibilities) is always for a human (who is 
always technically equipped, even if he/she 
doesn't actually use any interface), and the 
artefact alone does not enact anything. But if 
the capacity to enact lies in the user, the 
human’s experience is always depending on 
the artefacts, and the artefact does change the 
quality of enaction. 
So already for a single user the enactive 
knowledge is something situated between the 
4 Enaction and Enactive Interfaces: A Handbook of Terms 
user and the artefact, but what about the 
social exposure? The couple artefact / sen-
sory-motor contingencies is something that 
does evolve on the scale of the society. We 
think that the problem of usage is something 
intrinsically social, and that’s why it is diffi-
cult to report this problem to enactive know-
ledge of a single user. 
What is enactive, it’s not the interface it-
self, neither the usage alone, it’s the combina-
tion of them. If one designs a very enactive 
interface, but there is no social acceptance or 
implication, in the best case the usage will be 
restricted to a narrow community. But the 
contrary is also true: if the interface is not 
appropriated, there’ll be no enaction (in the 
following sense: no good quality of relation 
between the human and the world) even if 
there is a wide social exposure. So, we need 
to distinguish two sorts of enactive inter-
faces: in a broad sense, every artefact is enac-
tive because it does modify the sensory-
motor contingencies, and bring forth a par-
ticular lived experience, even if the artefact is 
really constraining; in a strong sense, the 
criteria for the interface to be enactive (good 
quality of interaction, transparency, etc.) are 
actually still to find. 
But this is probably not enough. If we con-
tinue to think, - and that was the mainstream 
of industrial engineers -, that it is sufficient to 
design an interface that seems good to de-
signers, we would be probably wrong. Many 
works on the anthropology of usage and on 
involving the end-users in the process of 
design seem to go in this direction. 
Moreover, what one accepts as a quality of 
interaction, is not something independent on 
technology itself, more precisely on the 
socially accepted aspect of technology or, 
let’s say, its historical aspect (it’s not sure that 
the mobile phones with built-in cameras, in 
their actual state, are really useful and enac-
tive interfaces, they are however widely so-
cially accepted as something having a quality 
of interaction). In other words, the artefacts 
are not only responding to functional criteria, 
they are also, as Leroi-Gourhan [Leroi-
Gourhan [Leroi-Gourhan, 1993] for example 
has pointed out, a support of figurative aes-
thetics, and this may be to the detriment of 
the pure functionality. This could help us to 
understand in which way the acceptance of 
the artefacts is related to sensory-motor 
knowledge: this knowledge is always socially 
and technically transmitted and determined 
(however, it’s important to underline that in 
any case we are not talking about a techno-
logical determinism: the question is how the 
social structures arrange with the technology, 
and not what technology imposes by itself.) 
The core question is that it is difficult to 
know which interfaces will have the social 
implications. 
Would the artefact have or not the social 
exposure is not something lying in the tech-
nology if one considers the technology as the 
pure functionality of the artefact; but it is 
something lying in the technology if one 
considers the technology also as something 
intrinsically socially constructed, and also if 
one considers the social structures (for ex-
ample the exposure of the artefact related to 
the socially accepted criteria of aesthetics) as 
something technically transmitted. 
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